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Schrag: The Historical as a Feature of Experience

The Historical as a Feature of Experience
Calvin O. Schrag
My topic is "the historical as a feature of experience." The reason for this
very general statement of the topic is my reluctance to define it as a special
problem in the discipline commonly known as the philosophy of history. It does
not seem to fall under the rubrics ordinarily employed in marking out the different
approaches to this discipline. It is becoming increasingly common today to
distinguish "speculative" from "critical" philosophy of history (Dray and Walsh),
and what seems to amount to the same thing, "substantive" from "analytical"
philosophy of history (Danto). Today I wish to explore the possibility of
developing an approach to the question about history which does not readily
fall under either of the above rubrics. It may well be that this exploration will lead
me out of the ball-park of the discipline of philosophy of history as such. Much
will depend , I suspect, upon what one agrees as constituting the boundaries of
this ball-park. For the time being let us say that my topic deals with the historical
as a feature of experience.
I wish to begin with an attempt at a preliminary specification of my interest
by distinguishing my project both from speculative-substantive and criticalanalytical approaches to history. The distinction can be secured through an
explication of the basic question or questions which each poses. Professor Dray,
in his Philosophy of History, in my estimation gets very close to the heart of the
matter when he says: "The raison d'etre of critical philosophy of history is very
closely bound up with the question whether historical inquiry is, or is not,
'scientific', in a sense in which physics, biology, psychology or even applied
sciences like engineering are" (Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964 p. 2). The interests in
critical philosophy of history appear to be quite strictly methodological. The root
question is, "Is the methodology of that branch of inquiry known as history
basically similar to scientific inquiry?" Somewhat more specified, the concerns
revolve around an investigation of the role of explanation and generalization and
the possibility of objectivity in the craft of the historian. The root question in
speculative philosophy of history, as I understand it, is of a somewhat different
sort. Whether of a metaphysical or theological cast speculative philosophy of
history interrogates not the historian's craft and the underlying methodological
presuppositions, either tacit or explicit, but rather the nature of the historical
process itself. Here one asks: "What pattern (or patterns) are exhibited in the
actual course of historical events and what ultimate meaning (or lack of it) is
discernible in this course of events?" Admittedly, there are various modulations
of this root speculative question as it has been asked by various speculative
philosophers of history; nonetheless, allowing for these modulations, it does appear
to be pretty much at the center of interest in designs of this sort.
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The approach to history which I wish to elucidate in this paper proceeds from
another root question , differing from those of both critical and speculative
philosophy of history. The question might be formulated as follows: "How is the
sense of history manifested in human experience?", or more simply, "What
comprises history as experienced?" The primary concern here is neither with an
analysis of the historian's craft nor with a synoptic vision of the whole of
history; rather the focus of attention is on the sense of the historical as a
characteristic feature of lived-through experience. Yet we must hurriedly add
that although the question is significantly different from that asked either by
the critical analysts or the speculators on the substance of history, it has dimensions that seem to blend with certain features of both of the traditional approaches .
Insofar as it is designed for the purpose of exploring the experience of that which
is historical it has, if you will, a substantive feature . It constitutes an explication
of the occurrence of that which is historical rather than an investigation of the
logic of historical inquiry. In this respect it would seem to be more akin to the
speculative than the critical version. On the other hand, however, it simply
prescinds from any schematization of the larger designs of history understood
as a course or succession of happenings. Indeed the presupposition that history
can be rendered as a succession of happenings itself will need to be interrogated.
In the turning of one 's attention away from the schematization of the larger design
of history to the meaning and understanding of the historical as experienced
there is the suggestion of a kinship with a more critical-analytical inquiry standpoint. Further similarities and differences among the three approaches will hopefully become more apparent in the course of our elucidation.
Aristotle begins at one point by informing the reader that there are many senses
of the word, "substance." I will begin in a formally similar manner by suggesting
that there are many senses of the word, "history." I want briefly to examine
some of these and then move to an elaboration and consolidation of some
distinctions that are suggested, and in this way I hope that the nature and
exploration of my root question will take on more determinateness. Some of
these senses of history are quite ordinary and unsophisticated. This however
is not to be understood as an apology for an irreducible limitation in my
methodology. Moving out from some ordinary senses of what is intended by
the word, "history", has the singular merit of making explicit the experiential
basis of our inquiry, calling attention to history as it is lived-through in our ordinary
work-a-day world. The experience of history is first registered in the denomination
of everyday or ordinary senses, expressed in the language of everyday usage.
(1) There is first a way of speaking about history in which the expression,
"history", indicates simply and very generally the status of something being past.
We say that an event, or a cluster of events, say the depression of the thirties or
the decade of the sixties, "is now history" or "belongs to history." The expression,
"history", thus refers to that which has happened and now is no longer. That
which is referred to might be a specific person, as for example when one speaks
of Napolean, Louis XIV, and King George III as "historical figures. " Or the object
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of reference might be an artifact which was used during the time of some
ancient civilization but which now no longer exists. Again, one might use the
expression, "historical", in one's description of a species of animals, quite likely
the evolutionary predecessors of some species of modern animals, that once
roamed the wilds and has now become the subject matter for books on historical
biology. Or history might even refer to a past geological condition of the earth.
The earth, too, has its past, and hence, a kind of history. We thus speak of social
events, persons, artifacts, animals, and occurrences within physical nature as having
happened in the past, and this seems to qualify them as being, in some very
general sense, historical.
(2) There is another sense of history in which the expression "history" takes
on more specificity. This could be understood as a delimitation of the above
very general equation of history with anything or everything that is past. Our
second sense of history involves a circumscription of the social past. Admittedly,
this is still a very general notion insofar as it includes all that mankind has
ever thought, said, and done. Nonetheless, it does mark off history from what can
properly be called non-human events. History, thusly understood, has to do with
the human past.
(3) We move now to another usage in which there seems to be a somewhat
different deployment of the signification of the term. One might, and it seems
to me does, speak · of that which is present as being historical. Oxen yokes,
kerosene lamps, and spinning wheels still exist, usually in museums, and are
spoken of, and it would seem properly so, as historical artifacts. The famous
drawings preserved on the ceilings of the caves of Altimira are there to be
viewed in the present. They are present as historical drawings. The deployment
of significance at work here is also discernible in references to current political
policies or modes of social organization as being historical. This may mean
simply that they are considered to be outdated and no longer viable, but it may
also mean that there is a creative use of a past concept, policy or program in the
present. In any case, present artifacts and states of affairs can be considered to be
historical. Admittedly, in all of these cases a relatedness to the past obtains,
but it is now that which is present that somehow has within it the past. The
past continues to be exemplified in the present.
(4) The above sense of the historical as having to do with the present and the
exemplification of the past in the present is connected with, possibly implies, a
more specific understanding of historical presence as the time of passage or the
time of becoming. Whatever is historical is subject to the conditions of passage
and transition. The historical present is that frame or form in which this passage
is discernible. Although the spinning wheel still exists, the age and style of life
which was once so intimately associated with it has past. So we see in artifacts
themselves the passing character of styles of life and modes of behavior. The
style of life associated with the spinning wheel was once part of the experience
of historical presence, but this historical presence has ceased to be, it has become
past, and the presently existing artifact remains as a continuing testimony of the
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passing character of historical presence.
The peculiar character and structure of historical presence might be clarified
further through an attentive shift of focus from the artifact itself to the style
of life which somehow surrounds it. Artifacts have what one might call cultural
or spiritual predicates. A style of life. either past or present. is predicated by
every artifact. Not only the spinning wheel but also the new Boeing 747
predicates a style of life. an existential comportment. or a way of existing in
the world. It is when one focuses on this style of life that the meaning of
historical presence comes to the fore and my root question as to the experience
of history takes on intelligibility. History as experienced is the movement of a
style of life within a present that is subject to passage.
A chief ingredient of this experience is consciousness. I say "a chief ingredient"
rather than "the ingredient" of history as experienced is consciousness so as to
distinguish my elucidation from what I consider to be the main distortion of the
"idealistic" approach. History as the experiencing of life-styles is more than the
history of ·consciousness or the history of thought. It involves a wider context
of association in which the experiencer lives through situations. perceives objects.
fashions tools. and ·encounters other selves. We shall call this wider context the
historical life-world. To avoid the possible implication of idealism (particularly its
subjectivistic variety). I would suggest the language of "historical life-world" rather
than "historical consciousness". Within this historical life-world every style of
life is given over to passage as it exemplifies its past in its own development.
(5) This brings us to yet another feature in the experience of the historical. For
want of a better expression we shall call this historical experience in its
futuristic modulation. Here also . it seems to me. one can profitably begin with
an examination of some ordinary usages and locutions in which a futural sense
is implicated. One often speaks of perspectives or standpoints of evaluation of a
particular historical event or personage that will be opened up by that which
is yet to transpire. For example. one might say. "Only history will show whether
Kennedy was a great president" or "The justification of Agrarian Reform in Cuba
will have to wait for the verdict of history." Here history has to do in some sense
with that which is yet to come. It is suggested that history has a prospective or
protentional as well as a retentional cast. What seems to emerge here is an
understanding of history as a projectedness into the future . an anticipation of
sense or meaning yet to be disclosed.
When one attends to the historical character of a life style or consciousness.
this futuristic sense of the historical seems to be consolidated and intensified.
To experience the life-world as historical is to experience it as moving into a
future . Consciousness itself appears in the mode of historical presence as this
historical presence is infected with futurity. Consciousness as historical is projected
into that which is not yet. History as experienced is the awareness of presence
as this presence arrives from a past and moves into a future.
The above senses of history are in no way to be considered as being exhaustive
of what might be meant by history or by the historical. They will. however.
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hopefully provide us with a point of departure for a more thematic approach
to our root question, which might now be formulated, "How is the sense of the
historical experientially manifested?" Yet one might ask whether I have not
neglected the most common meaning of the word "history"-the one which the
proverbial "every schoolboy" knows. This meaning has to do with history as a
discipline or area of knowledge to be studied along with literature, mathematics,
physics, biology, and chemistry. Here we seem to have a rather definite indication
of what the term, "history", means. Yet, it becomes readily evident that the question
about history as a discipline or area of knowledge is a quite different sort of
question than that which interrogates the historical as a feature of the life-world
or lived experience. The former, on whatever level of sophistication it is asked,
projects an examination, however implicit, of the historian's craft and the logic
of his inquiry. The latter has to do with the historical feature of world experience
itself.
One might express the difference between the above questions by laying down
the distinction between written and lived history, or between "history" and "the
historical". History as written has to do with the narrative or "story" that comprises the craft of the historian. It is essentially the record of selected events
or happenings. The historical has to do with the events and happenings themselves as they are lived through by individuals in particular societies. Quite clearly,
not all historical events and happenings make their way into the records of
history. The historian, making use of certain criteria of significance, selects some
for his narrative and rejects others. But even more basically, the historical as a
frame of mind or style of life deployed by the historical actors themselves can
only obliquely, if at all, enter the historian's record of events. The historical is
not an objectively specifiable event, as is for example the death of a general
or the reign of a monarch. It appears as a world-fact that is not locatable within
a serial succession of objective events. But to say that the historical does not
appear as an objectively datable event does not mean that it is therefore to be
relegated to the limbo of subjectivity-if by subjectivity is meant the interior
or inside of the event as opposed to the exterior or outside. Collingwood, as is
well known, has recourse to such a distinction in his understanding of history
as the history of thought. I find this distinction to be of peculiarly limited use
in getting at the structure and status of the historical. The distinction between
"history" and "the historical" or between history as written and history as lived
is not an instance of the more general subject-object distinction. The historical has
to do with a deployment or posturing of experience which antedates the congealing
of this experience into regions of the subjective and the objective, into an inside
and an outside. The historical experiences lived through by a family or a community are no more and no less subjective than they are objective. Admittedly
as members of a family or a community we speak of them as our family or our
community, or our history within this family or community, but this does not
commit one to a subjectivism of an interiorized consciousness. The distinction
between the subjective and the objective, the inside and the outside, has not yet
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settled in when lived history is at issue. Or if one insists on making use of
subject-object language in speaking of the historical then it would need to be
said, with James, that the historical is subjective and objective both at once.
To what extent written history is able to "capture" the lived history of our
family and our community remains an important and interesting issue, but one
which we cannot pursue here. For our purposes it is only necessary to distinguish
history as lived (the historical) from history as written (history) so as to elucidate
the source of our root question about the texture of historical experience.
In the remainder of the paper I wish to consolidate some of the main features
suggested in our analysis of the preceding five senses of the historical in the
hope of initiating a more unified and more thematic approach to the issue at
hand. It is important that my current project be understood as one of initiating
or opening up an exploration of the experience of the historical rather than a
final formulation of the results of such an exploration. I myself am not at all clear
precisely to what results such an exploration might eventually lead.
There are a number of moves in my analysis, the explication of which might
facilitate an understanding of my general design. There is first of all the move
from the more or less ordinary senses of the historical to the feature of
temporality or time-consciousness which is implicated in all of the senses. Then
there is the move from temporality to historical action and from historical action
to historical reason. To speak of these as moves or transitions may be somewhat
misleading, insofar as the connection of these feature-concepts is more one of
interdependence than linear progression. One might define my project as that of
unpacking or elucidating the sense of the historical through an analysis of the
interrelated features of temporality, historical action, and historical reason.
The sense of the historical seems to be very closely bound up with the sense
of the temporal. It seems to be difficult to talk about the historical without also
talking about time. All of the senses of the historical that we have delineated
express a time-consciousness of some sort or another. (1) and (2) express an
explicit consciousness of the past; (3) and (4) are specifically attentive to the
present ; and (5) displays a consciousness of the future. It is thus that the
different senses of the historical involve a different posturing of time-consciousness, distinguished by relative emphases on the past, present, or future. It is
important to take note of the fact that the emphases are relative. (1) and (2),
which have to do with the historical as that which is past, implicate the present
as the standpoint from which the past is understood, and involve discreet
references to the future as a past which is yet to come; (3) and (4), which have
to do principally with the experience of historical presence, retain the past as
that which is now exemplified in the present, and point to the future as the
fringe of the present; (5) as the futuristic sense presupposes past and present
events and trends whose meaning and valuation are yet to be achieved. This is
all to say that the time-consciousness that is at work in the sense of the historical
exhibits an interpenetration of the three modalities of time. Time insinuates
itself into the experience of the historical in such a manner that past, present,

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol8/iss1/3
12

6

Schrag: The Historical as a Feature of Experience
and future are not discrete packages of nows-some gone, one present, and some
yet to come-but rather intercalating profiles through which the historical is perspectivally positioned. Lived history involves a content whose meaning is qualified
by the past and the future as they impinge upon the present.
A more concrete elucidation of the interpenetration of the three modalities of
time within lived history might be achieved through an examination of the closely
related concept of historical action. The sense of the historical is indissolubly
linked with historical action. It might indeed be said that the emergence of sense
in lived-through history finds its source in historical action. Historical action is
action in the present; or conversely the historical present is the locus of action.
The historical present is apprehended as the time for decision and action. It is
the opportune moment for something to be done, for a course of action to be
followed through, for a project to be entertained or realized. The histori'cal
present is, if you will, the base of operations for historical action. But this
historical present remains vacuous or empty without the envisagement of a completed act, projected as a goal. The expectation of a future yet to be actualized
is part of the cloth of historical action. The future as possibility insinuates itself
into the present. Historical action is protentional or prospective. But it is also
. retentional and retrospective. It draws from the past as well as from the future.
Living through the history of our family, our community, and our nation we act
in order to but also because of-in order to firm up the future in a particular
way and because of our peculiar past or destiny. Acting within our national history,
for example, we act in order to actualize freedom and justice for all. But this
action is imbued with a historical memory, with a rememberance of decisive
actions which have already pointed us toward our goal-the Declaration of Independence, the Emancipation Proclamation, etc. These are decisive events and
actions in our past, which give our past meaning, and which we seek in someway
to re-enact as we project the future. One might say that our past contains potentialities which have not yet been fully actualized, and in our historical action
we project these potentialities as that which is yet to be actualized. The "because
of" in our historical action is taken up by an "in order to". It is in some such
way, it seems to me, that historical action structures itself as an interlacing of
past, present and future . Historical action is both prospective and retrospective;
it involves both hope and memory. It is action in the present, anticipating a future
as it recollects the past.
We have examined, very briefly to be sure, the temporal structure of historical
experience and have discerned an interpenetration of the three modalities of past,
present, and future. We then attempted to show that this interpenetration is
peculiarly illustrated in the phenomenon of historical action. Now in conclusion
I wish to elucidate in a preliminary fashion the concept of historical reason by
discussing its connection with historical action and temporality.
I find that discussions on the role of reason in history tend toward a kind
of stalemate because of a presupposed and unacknowledged bifurcation of action
and reason. I wish to reconsider this bifurcation and suggest that it ultimately
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conceals the decisive expression of both action and reason in . the experienced
historical life-world. My choice of the term, "experience" , is already indicative
of the attempt to surmount this bifurcation. Experience has to do with both seeing
into a situation and acting from within it. Action and reason, decision and thought,
doing and knowing are interrelated components in any given undivided portion of
historical experience. The projection of possibilities which accompanies the making
of a decision is already an act of knowledge. When historical action occurs
reason has already settled in and is already at work. This is not to say that
every historical action occurs for the "right" reason (whatever this might mean
in the end). Admittedly, evaluation of historical action goes on and on, but what is
at issue here is a more descriptive notion of reason-reason as an operating force
in the decision making process-rather than reason as an external standard for
the evaluation of those goals that emerge in the process of decision and action.
As is known by every schoolboy, one of the more fateful consequences of modern
idealism (perhaps modern philosophy itself) has been the isolation of the epistemological subject as the point of departure for philosophical analysis and construction. Whether this occurs in the dress of a Cartesian "thinking substance"
or a Kantian "transcendental ego" is not so much at issue here. What is at
issue is the consequence of such an inquiry-standpoint for an understanding of
the role of reason in historical experience. Reason in such a scheme of things
becomes an abstractive faculty or a power within a transcendental ego, whose
rights and privileges include a dominion over the vassals of perception and
action. Experience, historical or otherwise (if indeed there is a portion of
experience that is not imbued with historicity). must wait for a category or
conceptual scheme to swoop down from the summit of reason to supply it with
sense or significance. If we are to place reason back into the historical so as to
see its operations in lived-through experience then we may need to readjust our
inquiry-standpoint and displace our prejudgment of reason and experience as
being dichotomous. Merleau-Ponty, in my estimation, has shown that the traditional diremption of reason and perception can be surmounted through a careful
phenomenological analysis of the geneology of sense in perceptual experience.
This effort and achievement should be complemented with a phenomenology of
praxis, or more specifically, historical action, which would show that action, like
perception, is imbued with sense and structures of meaning.
Now it would not only be pretentious on my part to say that I have worked
out the connections between historical action and historical reason-it would
simply be untrue. I am suggesting, at this juncture, that historical action and
historical reason are much more kindred spirits than traditional discussions of
either have been willing to allow. My suspicion is that one would remain closer to
the data-i.e. the data of lived-through historical experience- if one would view
action and reason as correlative moments or polar elements which structure the
process of historical experience. The elucidation of this would require much time
and energy, but permit me in conclusion to suggest one vital issue which would be
unavoidable in the project of such an elucidation. This is the issue concerning
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the role of temporality in both historical action and historical reason. It would
seem that somewhere at bottom the occasion for the correlation would be provided by temporality. We have already seen how historical action is grounded
in a time-consciousness. Historical reason, too, it would seem, is time-bound
from start to finish, working always with the already experienced past, discerning
the significance of the past in the present through a projection of possible profiles
of meaning. The past, whether a previous life-style or a previous political event,
e.g. the storming of the Bastille, is understood only when it is comprehended
within its various profiles of meaning. These profiles of meaning are subject
to variation. The storming of the Bastille may hold a different configuration of
meaning for the Frenchman than for the Russian or the American, and each of these
different configurations is subject to change or modification. The meanings which
historical reason discerns in the past-whether personal or social-are never fixed
and finished, somehow there to be packaged and filed away. The historical past
offers itself for disclosure time and again. What my personal past means is never
a fait accompli. I am ever in process of ordering my existence in such a way
that my past continues to have significance as I anticipate future projects, and
by virtue of this anticipation or projective understanding new profiles of meaning
with respect to my past can be released. The same would hold true for the past
in our family , community, and national histories for our personal past is never
detachable from these. The point at issue here is that temporality provides the
condition for the releasement of new profiles of meaning. The depreciation of the
temporal as a coefficient of adversity for the project of historical reason- what
one might call the legacy of Platonism-needs to be combatted. Temporal passage
as such is not a thorn in the side of historical reason. In the advance toward the
future new perspectives on that which has been can be opened up, and the
question, "What does the past mean?" approached in a new light. The "distance"
of the past from the present is not as such a factor of negativity. The task of
historical understanding is not that of making the past coincide with the present,
under the presupposition that were the past present it could be more fully known.
This presupposition is here questioned. The significance of an event or style of
life can be determined only as it works out its consequences.
Yet this releasement of new meanings in the project of historical reason is
always contextualized within certain insurmountable limitations. One might speak
of this as the finitude of historical reason. The sense or meaning discerned by
historical reason remains partial and perspectival. To express the point in another
way, there is no standpoint beyond the historical from which its significance might
be fully comprehended. We always view the historical from within it, or from
the side, but never from above. A rather lucid recognition of this, as I understand
it, was the occasion for Marx's protest against Hegel's theo-metaphysics of history,
which in the end could not resist the lure of a perspectiveless standpoint. The
irony in the development of Marxism, however, was that neither Marx nor the
Marxists remained true to the original insight that was used against Hegel, and,
hence, they aggrogated to themselves an absolutistic standpoint of their own.
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We might sum up matters a bit by saying that temporality qualifies historical
reason in two determinate ways. It is the occasion for the releasement of new
perspectives of meaning, and it provides the form of finitude that determines
the perspectivity of historical meaning. Temporality supplies both a condition for
creativity and a factor of limitation, and both enter into the structure of historical
reason. Hence, one can speak of historical reason as being infected with a kind
of ambiguity. On the one hand there is the drive for the releasement of new
meanings through the expansion of possibilities and perspectives; on the other
hand there is the hard fact of finitude which keeps reason within the context
of perspectives. Although historical reason need not be riveted to any given
perspective, it cannot surmount its destiny of being within some perspective.
In this paper we have sought to work out a possible approach to the understanding of the historical as a feature of lived experience. Proceeding from an
analysis of more or less ordinary or everyday senses of the historical we discerned
that the historical illustrates a peculiar structuring of time-consciousness. We saw
specifically how the structure of temporality is at work both in historical action
and historical reason. The two, we argued, are inseparable. They constitute, if
you will , the cross-section of the experience of the historical, insofar as experience
is both the seeing into and comprehending of a situation and the acting or
behaving within it. We then concluded with an investigation of the implications
of temporality for historical reason and saw how it both occasioned the releasement of meaning and supplied the condition for the finitude of historical knowledge.
Purdue University
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